In the Lagos-Wright model of money, monetary frictions alone cannot be a source of equilibrium multiplicity. However, the conclusion depends on the assumption that the agents always enter the centralized market after completing a transaction in the decentralized markets. In this paper, we investigate a monetary model in which the centralized market opens once, but the decentralized markets open twice in each period. We show that as the seller's money balances affect the buyer's problem in the first decentralized market, there may be multiple stationary equilibria.
Introduction
The microfoundation of monetary models has been an important topic in macroeconomics.
In a seminal paper by Lagos and Wright (2005) , henceforth LW, a tractable monetary model is constructed in which the role of money is explicitly described. In LW, each period is divided into two subperiods, day and night. Money facilitates trades in the day market in which buyers and sellers are anonymous. The LW framework is now heavily used in monetary economics.
In LW, the uniqueness of the steady state is shown only under specific restrictions on the utility function.
1 Recently, Wright (2010) relaxed the assumption and showed that the steady state is always unique. Wright (2010) also argued that monetary frictions alone cannot generate multiple equilibria.
In this note, we study a version of LW in which decentralized markets open twice in each period. Each date is divided into three subperiods-morning, afternoon, and night. The morning and afternoon markets are decentralized, while the night market is centralized. We show that for some utility functions, there are multiple stationary equilibria. This is because the objective function of the buyer in the morning market depends on the seller's money balances, and then the first-order conditions may not be monotone in the equilibrium money balances. The uniqueness result in Wright (2010) depends on the assumption that the agents always enter the centralized market after the transactions in the decentralized market.
2
Our set-up is similar to that of Ennis (2009) , who investigated a variant of LW by assuming that buyers may bypass the centralized market; however, he does not study equilibrium multiplicity.
In the following, Section 2 describes our model and Section3 shows the equilibrium multiplicity. Proofs are of the propositions are in the Appendix.
1 LW shows the uniqueness when the utility function in the day market u satisfies u Lagos and Wright (2003) studied a model which is similar to LW, but they showed that the steady states can be multiple. The difference between the two papers is that the former introduce real return on money, while the latter does not. Our model closely follows LW.
Set-up
Time is discrete and changes from t = 0 to +∞. There is a continuum of infinitely lived agents with unit measure. Each date is divided into three subperiods-morning, afternoon, and night. The morning and afternoon markets are decentralized and the night market is centralized. In the following, consecutive period variables are indexed by +1.
At the beginning of each period, the agent receives an idiosyncratic preference shock.
With probability α, he becomes a Type-1 agent, who consumes in the morning market and produces in the afternoon market. Similarly, with probability α, he becomes a Type-2 agent, who produces in the morning market and consumes in the afternoon market. The agent who consumes is called a buyer and the one who produces is called a seller. With probability 1 − 2α, the agent becomes neither Type-1 nor Type-2, and enters the night market directly. In Section 3.3, we investigate a case where the probability of becoming a buyer (and also a seller) in the morning market is independent of the one in the afternoon market.
In the morning market, the buyer obtains utility u(q) from consuming q units of output. The cost function of the seller is q. We assume that there exists q * > 0, such that u ′ (q * ) = 1. Similarly, in the afternoon market, the buyer obtains utilityû(q) from consumingq units of output. The cost function of the seller isq. We letŝ(q) =û(q) − q denote the surplus. Letq * > 0 be such thatû ′ (q * ) = 1. In the night market, each agent obtains utility U (c) from consuming c units of general goods and disutility h from producing h units of goods. Let c
The role of money is to facilitate trades in the morning and afternoon markets, where buyers and sellers are anonymous. The buyers use money to pay. Money is divisible and storable, but it is intrinsically useless. The growth rate of the money supply M is γ.
Night market
We solve the model backward. At night, the agent solves 
As in LW, trades are efficient and the money balances at the beginning of each period are the same across agents. From the quasi-linearity of the utility function, W is a linear function of the nominal balance, and W (m) = φm + W (0).
Afternoon market
In the afternoon, the buyer (i.e., Type-2) makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer (q,d) to the seller (i.e., Type-1), whereq is the quantity andd is the monetary transfer. The participation
As W is linear, this is simplified as
The buyer chooses the offer so that the participation constraint binds. Eq. (3) reduces tô
We letv
Since the participation constraint is binding, the value function of the seller isV
morning afternoon night 
Morning market
In the morning, the buyer (i.e., Type-1) makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer (q, d) to the seller 
As u andV are increasing and concave, the objective function is concave in d. Therefore, the choice of d is optimal if and only if it satisfieŝ
and the equality holds if d < m. The value function of the seller is
where i = φ βφ +1 − 1 is the nominal interest rate. In the steady state, i = (1 + γ)/β − 1.
We let z = φm be the real value of money balances. Similarly, we let ρ = φd denote the real value of money transfer in the morning market.
Multiple equilibria
Here we discuss steady states.
Equilibrium condition
First, we assume that the constraint d ≤ m binds in the morning. If m s = m, from (6),
The constraint d ≤ m is binding if and only ifV
Next we assume d < m. From the envelope theorem,
Since d < m, ρ < z. Further, Eq. (7) is written asv
there exists such ρ, if and only ifv
′ (2z)u ′ (v(2z) −v(z)) < 1.
A stationary equilibrium (φ, q,q, d,d) is a tuple in which φ is the price of money, q(q)
is the quantity in the morning market (afternoon market), and d(d) is the transfer in the morning market (afternoon market).
We obtain the following results.
Proposition 1 A stationary equilibrium (φ, q,q, d,d) exists if the following conditions
are satisfied:
where i = (1 + γ)/β − 1, and γ is the money growth rate.
2) the quantities q andq and the money transfers d andd satisfy the following condition:
where ρ is such that ρ ≤ z andv
3) the price of money evolves according to φ/φ +1 = 1 + γ.
The next proposition deals with the optimal policy.
Proposition 2
The Friedman rule is the optimal monetary policy.
Number of equilibria
or equivalently g(z) = i/α + 2. We focus on the CRRA functions u(q) = A The equilibrium can be multiple because the buyer's objective function in (6) depends on and may be non-concave in the seller's nominal balance m s . In LW, the centralized market always follows the decentralized market, and the seller's nominal balance is independent of the buyer's objective function due to the quasi-linearity of the utility function.
Thus, the equilibrium is unique in LW.
Extension
Thus far, we assumed that the role of the agent in the afternoon is determined at the beginning of the morning. Here, we assume that the preference shocks are independent. In 
D Proof for Proposition 4
The structure of the night market is the same as before. 
In the morning market, the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer (q, d) to the seller.
The participation constraint isF (m
The level of d is optimal if it satisfies the first-order condition:
From the Inada condition u 
Eqs. (13) and (14) determine z and ρ.
Transactions in the afternoon depend on the buyer's role in the morning. If he was also a buyer, his real balances at the beginning of the afternoon market, say φm, are equal to z + ρ and the quantity isq =q 1 ≡ min{z + ρ,q * }. If he was a seller, φm = z − ρ andq =q 2 ≡ min{z − ρ,q * }. If he was neither a buyer nor a seller, φm = z and q =q 3 ≡ min{z,q * }. The real money transfer φd is always equal to the quantity. A stationary equilibrium is a vector (φ, d, q,q 1 ,q 2 ,q 3 ), such that the real balance z = φM and the real money transfer in the morning market ρ = φd satisfy (13) and (14), and
We assume that u(q) = A (13) and (14) are simplified as
(
with b = 1/ √ 2(1 + 2i). Substituting (15) into (16) yields
where h(x) = √ (1 − x) 2 + 1. We show that (17) can have two solutions that satisfy
We let ω 1 (x) = ln[ 
